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448 Reviews of Books 
how to see the past)," as if a researcher could proceed 
a single step toward the "facts" without developing 
criteria of selection, interpretation, and methodology 
by means of which "to see the past" (p. 35). 
Philosophy of historical writing, or "narrativism," 
Ankersmit believes, has brought the main recent 
"progress" in philosophy of history, particularly by 
Hayden White, W. H. Walsh, A. C. Danto, and L. 0. 
Mink (pp. 9, 62, 69). These philosophers see that "the 
historian's task is essentially interpretative (i.e., to find 
unity in diversity)" (p. 35). One awaits examples, but 
Ankersmit's pages, devoted to debating other philos- 
ophers of history about how such discovery should take 
place, never get around to applying his recommenda- 
tions. Some thirty historians are mentioned in the 
book, but Ankersmit does not analyze a single para- 
graph of their writing. Even when they are quoted with 
respect to their style or to what they think about 
narrative, the references are odd enough to cause one 
to wonder whether the historian's work has really been 
perused. 
For example, Ankersmit lauds Fernand Braudel's 
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Philip II (1973) for its synthesis of a "chaotic 
manifold," the "economic and political reality" of the 
sixteenth-century Mediterranean world. But Braudel's 
oxymoronic style ("liquid plains," "watery Saharas"), 
he concludes, "undermine[s] any fixed notions about 
the past," so that Braudel's book is not a "paradigm of 
'scientific' historical writing and . . . of historical syn- 
thesis," as it is "ordinarily seen," but instead illustrates 
"the disintegration of a metaphorical, synthetic under- 
standing of the past" (p. 226). These assessments clash 
with Braudel's assertions, which emphasized the pro- 
visional character of his own research findings, even 
though he also maintained that the findings, however 
incomplete, represented "realities." Ankersmit's judg- 
ments also .ignore Braudel's moves beyond linguistic 
means of communication. Maps, photographs, picto- 
rial reproductions, statistical tables, graphs, and mod- 
el-building (especially derived from geography and 
economics) serve not to undo its narrativity but to 
enlarge it heuristically beyond any "linguistic turn," 
any capturing of historical thought by a single mode of 
inquiry and representation. 
Three assumptions run through Ankersmit's essays 
that will give historians pause. First, he argues that 
history is a special kind of discourse, sui generis, quite 
separable from those produced by the social sciences, 
philosophical disciplines, and other narrative arts like 
the novel (pp. 36-41 strive to specify such separa- 
tions). But historical works have been as often con- 
cerned with opening as with closing such disciplinary 
frontiers, from the time of the anthropological 
Herodotus to that of the demographic David Herlihy, 
sociological Georges Duby, and novelistic Carlo Ginz- 
burg. Second, the special kind of discourse called 
history can be analyzed, Ankersmit believes, without 
considering the process of production of that dis- 
course. In fact, however, the procedures that he finds 
peculiar to historical writing interact progressively and 
regressively throughout research and writing pro- 
cesses, producing a kind of craftlike tinkering to which 
Braudel, among others, frequently alludes. Finally, 
since Ankersmit believes that history is a discourse 
about "the past," he concludes that the best historiog- 
raphy is that which builds up "individual statements" 
into "the historical narrative with the largest scope." 
The best history is the grandest: it adds meanings 
together to provide the widest view of a vast, single 
realm called "the past" (p. 41). Such a prescription 
applies to little historiographical practice, which rarely 
offers a single present-minded view about a single, 
unified set of bygone times. Historical writing, like the 
research communicated in it, juxtaposes many past- 
past, past-present, and past-present-future perspec- 
tives in contrastive relation to each other. 
Ankersmit's "belvedere" criterion for historiograph- 
ical excellence (p. 41) may be profitably applied to the 
claims of handbooks, textbooks, and popular guides to 
"the past," but can it be the prime criterion for 
historical students and researchers? Historical work 
requires one to think first and last about how to probe 
multiply divided, contrastive pasts from the perspec- 
tives of multiple presents that are progressively iden- 
tified as work goes on. Only mediately and secondarily 
does one think about how to convey that probing. 
There is, certainly, continuous feedback of represen- 
tational on investigative techniques, but for most 
historians the end in view is to establish the best 
possible, although always temporary, state of the ques- 
tion being looked into, and not to create a narrative 
with the largest scope. 
SAMUEL KINSER 
Northern Illinois University 
SUSAN HERBST. Politics at the Margin: Historical Studies 
of Public Expression Outside the Mainstream. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. x, 231. 
Cloth $59.95, paper $18.95. 
In this book Susan Herbst presents four diverse case 
studies in an attempt to further our theoretical under- 
standing of "politics at the margin." And diverse they 
are: the Salonnieres of the French Enlightenment, the 
African-American newspaper The Chicago Defender, 
The Masses magazine, and the Libertarian Party. 
Herbst sets out a broad agenda for this brief work, 
taking on Jurgen Habermas's notion of the public 
sphere and how public-opinion polling and survey 
research (citing Pierre Bourdieu) have ignored the way 
that opinion is created in smaller groups. In her survey 
of the relevant thinkers who touch on such questions 
as community boundaries and power(lessness), Herbst 
moves with agility through Steven Lukes, Michel Fou- 
cault, Robert Bellah, and Ferdinand Tonnies. From 
this setting of the stage, Herbst jumps to the case 
studies, where some distillation of the notions of this 
group of theorists is intended to elucidate the actions 
of an array of politically marginal groupings. She sees 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1996 
General 449 
her contribution as a "template" for other case studies, 
claiming that a theoretical framework is necessary to 
understand the nature of these groups. 
Unfortunately, neither the theoretical framework 
nor the case studies themselves ever fully emerge. 
Herbst has the double burden of providing enough 
description of each group to make sense of it to the 
reader, then of relating what she has described to the 
theoretical bits and pieces she has gathered, but not 
resynthesized. The result is fragmented and leaves the 
reader skeptical about the entire project. 
The juxtaposition of the French salon with the 
campaigns of an African-American newspaper in Chi- 
cago in the 1930s through 1960s to elect a "Mayor of 
Bronzeville" as an alternative voice for the black 
community is certainly innovative but it does not work: 
the differences across centuries and cultures need to 
be taken into account, as do the boundaries between 
political and cultural marginalization, before one can 
start to generalize. Herbst states simply in her third 
case study that the "salon" of Mabel Dodge at which 
writers and artists working for The Masses were regular 
guests was "so similar in character to the more liberal 
eighteenth century salons" (p. 126), without qualifica- 
tion or further explanation. She asserts ahistorical 
notions about American newspapers while chiding The 
Masses for its racial and sexual attitudes without 
considering the larger American context. And the 
author completely dismisses The Masses as "in thrall" 
to the Communist Party, which simply cannot be said 
of its early days, despite the testimony of Max East- 
man. By emphasizing selected aspects of each marginal 
group, Herbst must leave out the rich detail necessary 
to do comparative history. 
The lack of historical specificity in the earlier chap- 
ters leaves the author ill equipped to explain the 
contemporary Libertarian Party. This case study seems 
to be a plea for attention to this specific group rather 
than explication of why this party is and may remain 
marginal in the American political spectrum. Had the 
historical chapters that preceded it been more success- 
ful in fashioning the "template" that Herbst proposed 
to provide, perhaps it could have been possible to 
better understand marginalization. 
ELLIOTT SHORE 
Institute for Advanced Study 
CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY. The Idea of Luxury: A Concep- 
tual and Historical Investigation. (Ideas in Context.) 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xiv, 
271. Cloth $69.95, paper $24.95. 
In this wide-ranging and insightful study, Christopher 
J. Berry seeks to show that the idea of luxury is deeply 
implicated in the broader political question of the 
nature of the social order and changing conceptions of 
the "good society" from Greek antiquity to the present. 
Drawing on philosophy, political and economic theory, 
and intellectual history, Berry argues for the persis- 
tence and central importance of the category of luxury 
in every society's self-understanding. His analysis sug- 
gests that luxury goods do not constitute a separate 
category distinct from necessities but instead relate to 
basic human needs and fall into four categories in 
which needs and desire interact: sustenance, shelter, 
clothing, and leisure. Berry grounds his conceptual 
scheme in a historical account that shows how luxury 
has changed from being a negative term, conceived as 
threatening to social virtue in classical antiquity and 
salvation in medieval Christendom, to a positive term 
in modern times, sanctioning insatiable desire and 
consumption. 
The main reason for the negative evaluation of 
luxury in classical thought, according to Berry, is that it 
makes men soft and effeminate and hence incapable of 
defending themselves and their communities against 
external enemies and internal conflict. For Plato in 
particular, desire, unlike need, is insatiable and, if left 
unchecked, leads to the ruin of society and its citizens. 
The Romans, too, notably Cato the Elder and Seneca, 
denounced luxury because it represented the use of 
wealth to promote private interests at the expense of 
virtus, or the public interest. Christian thinkers in turn, 
from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas, although they 
rejected the this-worldly political ideal of classical 
writers, shared the view that luxury, which they asso- 
ciated principally with carnal lust, was negative be- 
cause it threatened salvation. What classical and Chris- 
tian thinkers held in common, Berry emphasizes, and 
what distinguished both from modern thinkers, was 
their view of human needs as fixed and the fixed 
natural life as normative, subject to corruption by 
change. 
This view was first seriously challenged in the sev- 
enteenth century by, among others, Thomas Hobbes, 
Thomas Mun, and Nicholas Barbon, who formulated 
the characteristically modern position that desires are 
infinite and that the proliferation of desires is not a 
cause of corruption but instead the "natural" way of 
things. Thus Barbon, for example, could argue that 
fashion and luxury goods can be justified by their 
promotion of trade and their positive effect on social 
well-being. This celebration of homo oeconomicus 
followed from what Berry calls the "de-moralisation of 
luxury" (p. 101), and the new perspective became 
central to the thinking of Bernard Mandeville, David 
Hume, and, above all, Adam Smith. Berry emphasizes 
in their work the depoliticization of the idea of the 
"public good" that luxury had formerly been presumed 
to corrupt and the loss of the transindividual character 
of the public good. As the new era of liberal politics 
proceeded to give priority to unfettered private eco- 
nomic activity, morality became a matter of private 
choice and human nature was thought to manifest 
itself in the material motivations underlying these 
choices. 
Berry devotes an intelligent chapter to the historicist 
critique of the age-old assumption of the fixity and 
permanence of human needs by G. W. F. Hegel and 
Karl Marx. They constructed new temporal teleolo- 
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